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The Mortgage Bankers Association of Florida is
pleased to have the opportunity to publish, as
a public service, the report on Usury of the
Citizens Economic Advisory Council, appointed
by the Comptroller of Florida.
Such a study was authorized in Florida by
Governor Askew in a veto message dated June
26, 1975. Although the study was completed
on March 8, 1977, it has received little
publicity.
At a time when existing usury laws are disrupt
ing financial markets in many states, including
Florida, by discriminating in the allocation of
credit, it is appropriate that corrective legis
lation should be enacted. Many states have
already taken such action based upon recommenda
tions made in studies authorized by various
legislative bodies and private organizations.

llEJ >.\HT�IE�T OF B.\XKING AND PfXANCE

TALLAHASSEE
32304

Gerald A. Lewis

Comptroller of Florida

FOREWORO
During the 1975 session, the Legislature passed four bills dealing
with the maximum interest rates that certain financial institutions may charge
on various types of loans.

On June 26, 1975, the Governor vetoed all four

bills and in his veto message stated "I have asked the Comptroller to review
the stctte usury law on interest rate ceilings and reconnnend ways to assure
an adequate supply of money at the lowest possible interest rates under full
and free competition among various financial institutions."
Pursuant to the Governor's request to review the State's usury laws,
I formed the Citizens Economic Advisory Council.

A Usury Subcommittee of the

Citizens Economic Advisory Council was appointed to study the issue of usury
and to make recommendations to the Legislature.

That Subcommittee's final

report is set forth herein.
The Legislature has made significant changes in Florida's usury laws
as a result of the Usury Subconnnittee's findings.

I want to express my grat

itude to all of the individuals who served on that Subcommittee for their
contribution in this very important area.

I would like to especially thank

Mr. Lon Worth Crow, Jr., who served as chairman of the Usury Subcommittee, for
his tremendous effort.s and leadership in making this report possible.

E LO • LEWIS
COMPTROLLER OF FLORIDA

FINAL REPORT
LON WORTH CROW, JR, - CHAIRMAN

USURY SUB-COMMITTEE
CITIZENS ECONOMIC ADVISORY COUNCIL
MARCH

8, 1977

In June, 1975 Governor Askew vetoed a series of bills which
had been passed by the Florida Legislature and which raised the max
imum allowable interest rates that could be charged on various types
of loans under Florida's existing usury statutes.

In his veto message

the Governor indicated that he would ask the State Comptroller to
11 •

•

•

review the state usury law on interest rate ceilings and recommend

ways to assure an adequate supply of money at the lowest possible inter
est rates under full and free competition among various financial insti
tutions.

11

Toward thi� end a Usury Sub-Committee of the Citizens Ad

visory Council was appointed by Gerald A. Lewis, Comptroller of the
State of Florida.
Exhibit 1).

This sub-committee consists of 12 members (see

This document represents the final report of that sub-com

mittee.

A.

Background
This report will not attempt to describe the detailed evolution

of usury statutes in the United States and in Florida.

Suffice it to say

that the concept of usury can be traced back to ancient Greece and Rome
and that early law in the American Colonies followed then existing Euro
pean laws on the subject.

Since the English set the usury limit in 1700
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at 6. 0 percent, that rate was adopted b y the original colonies and
in some cases never changed until 1968.1 Meanwhile, as new states
were

formed, they adopted legal usury limits that were higher than

6. 0 percent in recognition of the fact that market rates were getting
close to the usury limit. 2
The history of usury laws since the early colonial times 1s
exactly what one would expect in a situation where an attempt is
made to freeze the price of one commodity or service while allowing
all other prices to adjust to market levels.

As time passed economic

cyclical and longer term forces produced instances where market interest rates approached or surpassed the usury laws of the selected
states.

When this occurred the usury ceilings interferred with the free

flow of funds and legitimate business brought pressure in the various
state legislatures to modify the usury statute.
lowing changes normally would result.
raise

the maximum basic usury rate.

One or both of the fol

The state legislature would
For example, in state after

state we find a trend of the basic usury rate going from 6. 0 percent
in colonial days to 8. 0 percent, and finally, to 10. 0 percent or higher.
1Its interesting to note that Great Britian, whose usury laws were
adopted, repealed all usury laws in 1854, some 123 years ago.
2

A good general history of usuty can be found in Jarret C. Oeltjen,
"Usury:Utilitarian or Useless?" Florida State University Law
Review, Vol. 3, Spring 1975, pp, 169-235,
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In addition, we find more and more exceptions being written into the
state usury laws as selected groups attempted to obtain usury relief
in their particular kind of market.

For example, in all states con-

sumer loans have separate and higher maximum rates than the state's
basic usury rate.
1naximum rate.

Revolving credit loans have yet another higher
In most states business loans are either totally ex-

empt from the usury statute or have a higher maximum rate.

Another

common practice is to exempt loans above a certain size from the
usury statute.

FHA and VA mortgage loans have maximum rates set

by the Fedc>ral Government and are also exempt from a state's usury
statute.

In still other cases loans to corporations are exempt or have

a higher maximum rate while loans of the same size to noncorporate
borrowers are still subject to the basic usury rate.

The list of ex

emptions goes on and on. 3
Thus, at the present time most state usury laws represent a
hodgepodge of exemptions, legal interpretations, and stated basic
maximum interest rates with or without allowable additional fees and
charges.

In addition, many c redjt market arrangements have been

devised for circumventing usury laws and permitting credit flows which
3The resulting morass has generated a substantial residue of legal
interpretations adding to the administrative complexities of doing
business across and within the various states. See, for example,
Mendes Hershman, "Usury and the Tight Mortgage Market," The
Banking Law Journal, Vol. 85, Number 3, March 1968, pp. 189-218 .
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would otherwise be halted.

Some of these activities may be outright

violations of the law, such as simply ignoring the ceiling, or by calling
the payment something other than interest.

However, violation of

usury laws frequently carries high financial penalties and, therefore,
legitimate lenders are generally reluctant to knowingly violate the
statutes.
As a matter of interest a brief summary of the major provisions
of existing usury laws for each of the states and the District of Columbia
is presented in Table 1.

In addition to the exceptions listed virtually

all states have separate maximum rates covering consumer loans, revalving credit, and rates for finance companies.

Because of the complex

nature of the law with. regard to usury the table may not be completely
accurate with respect to certain specific technical provisions.

It does,

however, give the reader an opportunity to gain some conception of the
wide range of opinion concerning interest rate regulation.

Note that it

is not possible to determine the relative restrictiveness of the usury
statute by just examining the basic usury rate.

The basic usury rate

along with each state's usury exemptions determine the impact of a state's
interest regulations.

B.

The Current Usury Problem
Throughout much of the period since the 1920' s, usury laws have

not created problems for legitimate business or the economy because
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rnarket interest rates were generally well below the usury ceilings.
However, with the rise in inflation and interest rates since mid 1960's
market interest rates have climbed above many states' usury ceilings
on several occasions.

This was particularly true in 1974 when the prime

rate, i.e., the borrowing rate for the most credit w orth borrower, climbed
to 12-12. 2 5 percent.

This was well above the usury maximum in effect in many

of the states.
There are two points that should be noted when considering market interest behavior during the last decade.

First, in the tight money

periods of 1974 and to a somewhat lesser extent in 1969 and 1966 market
rates climbed above usury ceilings in many states thus affording demon
strable first hand experience on how major credit markets·can be disrupted
by attempts to limit interest rate ceilings.

States with low usury ceilings

found that the flow of funds from out-of-state lenders was cut off and th6.t
local funds moved out-of-state in search of higher returns.
studies had

While academic

always indicated that this was likely to happen, actual experi

ence left no doubt about the issue. Artificially low usury ceilings interfere
with the free and efficient flow of funds and work to restrict economic <levelopment.

This in no longer a matter open to conjecture!

A second point to note is that this usury problem 1s not unique
to Florida.

Every state with a usury ceiling that fell below prevailing

market rates found that its credit markets were being disrupted by
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the low usury ceilings.

As a result, in state after state usury study

committees were set up to recommend changes to the existing state
usury statutes.

Without exception every study effort came to the same

general conclusion, that is,that artificial usury ceilings were detrimental
to efficient credit allocation and sound economic developrrent.

Many of these

states have either abolished their usury laws altogether or have adopted
far more liberal usury statutes.
The vast amount of study material gathered through these various
efforts has been of invaluable aid to this committee and has made the
preparation of this report much easier.

In this report we will not attempt

to go over these studies in detail, however, a few highlights to provide
the reader with the general flavor of the findings may be in order.
One of the better efforts to measure the quantitative impact of
restrictive usury ceilings is a study conducted by James R. Ostas. 4 In
this study the mortgage lending activities of sixteen states with usury
ceilings below market interest levels were compared with the remaining
uncontrolled states. The study concluded:
"Given situations where free mar·ket rates are above usury
limits, the empirical analysis implies that loan to price ratios,
loan maturities, and mortgage loan volume..., decrease in pro
portion to the amount by which free market rates exceed usury
4 James R. Ostas, "Effects of Usury Ceilings in the Mortgage Market,"
The Journal of Finance, Vol. XXXI, No. 3, June 1976, pp. 823-834.
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limits. Loan fees were found to be positively related to the
amount by which market rates exceed usury limits.
"With the exception of the loan maturity variable, the
effects of usury limitations upon loan terms and volume were
statistically significant at a 99 percent confidence level.
Especially noteworthy was the estimate that a 100 basis point
(1%) difference between the market equilibrium rate and the
usury rate reduced mortgage loan volume.•.by a minimum esti
mate of 11 percent.
"It was concluded that the legal restrictions on contract
interest rates resulted· in noninterest rationing of borrowers
through (1) the requiring of higher loan fees, (2) the requiring
of higher down payments, and (3) the requiring of shorter loan
maturities. Moreove-r, it was concluded that contract interest
rate restrictions reduced the incentive of lenders to make
mortgage Joans,· with loan volume being reduced and new con
struction conc�m1:1itantly being curtailed. 115
Similar conclusions were reached in a recent study of Minnesota's
usury law.

Speaking of the impact of the usury law during periods of

tight credit the study notes:
"(Minnesota's) ...usury law has had a significant effect
on mortgage financing. For those conventional mortgages n1ade
in Minnesota during the 1969-70 tight credit period, maturity
lengths were relatively shorter and down payments relatively
larger than they were in nonusury states. Furthermore, when
market rates exceeded 10 percent (as in the 1973-74 tight credit
period) and lenders no longer found conventional mortgages
made in Minnesota an attractive investment, these mortgages
virtually disappeared--the borrowers only option was the FHA/
VA mortgage. ' 1 (which were not subject to the state's usury
statute) 6
5 Ostas , pp. 83 0 -831.
6Arthur J. Rolnic k, Stanley Graham and David Dahl, "Minnesota I s Usury
Law: An Evolution," Ninth District Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis, April 1975, pp. 16-23.
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A recent Missouri usury study came to the same general conclusions. After documenting the fact that credit flows to Missouri
borrowers had been drastically cut during tight money periods when
market interest rates were well above the state's usury ceiling the
study goes on to point out:
"Missouri simply cannot have its financial cake and
eat it too. That is, we (the borrower) cannot expect to
get high rates of interest on our savings deposits, but to
pay low rates of interest on our mortgages and otner loans.
No amount of wishful thinking to the contrary will solve tne
problem but some changes in legislation surely will help.
"We should realize that usury laws are a type of his
toric relic. Historians trace them back to the Middle Ages.
Usury laws in tne United States were inherited from the British
in colonial days... 1 but 'Great Britian repealed its usury laws
over a century ago--in 1854. 7
A Virginia study conducted shortly after the relatively mild tight
money period of 1966 summed up the adverse impacts of usury with the
following comment:
"The Commission recognized the fact that the housing
industry is suffering throughout the entire nation as a result
of the 'tight money' conditions. The Commission further
recognized the fact that a change in the laws of Virginia will
not solve all the problems of the housing industry. However,
the evidence clearly indicates that the conditions in the Virginia
housing industry would not be as severe or critical if the law
did allow this sector of our economy to compete freely for
7Murray L. Weedenbaum, Chariman, Governor's Economic Advisory
Committee. From a report to the Honorable Christopher S. Bond,
Governor, State of Missouri, March 12, 1974.
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money m the open market. It is impossible to say exactly
how much better off the housing industry would be, but the
evidence indicated that the decline would have been reduced
by between 10 and 20 percentage points. E xpressed another
way. the industry would be about 25 percent more active than
it currently is. The preciseness of the figures can be ques
tioned within limits, but there is no question in the minds of
the members of the Commission about the fact that a change in
the (usury) law would benefit the housing industry in particular
and the economy of the state in general. 8
11

The findings of a recent New York usury study essentially came
to the same conclusions as the studies already cited. 9
Most of the studies thus far cited have tended to stress the
adverse impact of state usury laws on the mortgage market.

This is

natural since all states have s·eparate laws which set higher maximum
rates on small consumer loans and in varying degrees all states have higher
ceilings (or no ceiling at all) on business loans.

There tend to be fewer

usury exemptions with re gard to mortgage lending, thus, this market
has in fact tended to be hurt to a greater extent. when market rates climb
above the usury ceiling.

It would be a mistake, however, to conclude

that usury ceilings do not, on occasion, adversely in1pact on these other
markets as well.

Several examples of such in,pacts are discussed below.

811Money and Interest," Report of the Money and Interest Study Commission
lo the Governor and the General Assembly of Virginia, Noven,ber, 1967.
9Ernest Kahn, Carmen Carlo, and Bernard Kaye, 11 The Impact of New York 1 s
Usury Ceiling on Local Mortgage Lending Activity, 11 New York State Banking
Department, January 1976.
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The California constitution sets a maximum 10 percent interest
ceiling for all lenders except banks and savings and loan associations.
When interest rates climbed to record levels in 1974 funds normally
provided California business by nonexempt sources such as insurance
companies, pension funds, and mortgage bankers, virtually disappeared.
Since approximately 4 7 percent of business borrowings comes from such
nonexempt lenders California businesses found it impossible or very
difficult to raise funds because of the usury restriction.

After impir-

ically documenting its case a California usury study concludes:
"When market rates approach and exceed the 10 percent
usury ceiling, the amount of funds available from nonexempt
lenders declines significantly. Long term funds that normally
flow into the state are diverted elsewhere, and the flow of funds
increases from California-based lenders to borrowers outside
the state. 1110
As mentioned, business loans are generally not subject to the
same usury limitations as other classes of loans.

As a matter of interest,

23 states have no usury ceilings at all on such loans, and 12 other states
have no ceilings on business loans above a certain dollar amount.

Three

other states have maximum rates tied to a floating rate, while six other
states have maximum business loan ceilings at levels ranging from 18 to
45 percent.

To date, money rates in the United States have not risen to

levels that such ceilings seriously interferred with the operation of the
10

Touche Ross and Company, 11The Usury Law and its Impact on Business
Loans in California,1 1 November, 1975.
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money market.
Only 7 states rn the Uni.ted States have maximum usury rates
on business loans at 15 percent or less. Three of these states are
Arkansas, Tennessee ancJ California which have a maximum business
loan ceilings of 10 percent.

California, of course, is a mixed system

with no n1axin1un1 business rate for

banks and savings and loan as-

sociations but a maxi.mum rate on nonexempt lenders. Interestingly,
Arkansas and Tennessee were particularly hard hit by lack of funds
during the tight money period in 1974 when market rates climbed above
10 percent. 11 Two states, Washington and Idaho have maximum business
rates of 12 percent while two other states, Mississippi and Florida, have
maximurn ceilings on business loans set at 15 percent.12 In Florida this
max1mun1 applies only to corporate borrowers.

Non-corporate business

borrowers face the basic 10 percent usury ceiling unless the amount they
borrow is over $500,000 at which point the 15 percent ceiling can be applied.
The present Florida 15 percent corporate usury ceiling was established in 1955 at which time the market prime rate was 3 percent. A 15
percent ceiling at that time was so far above the market rate that anything
11No rman N. Bowsler, "Usury Laws: Harmful When Effective, 11 Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, August, 1974.
·
.
2
1 Comparison
of the maximum base interest rate ceiling among states
does not always tell the whole story since some states permit certain
additional fees not to be charges in the nature of interest.
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higher might be c onsi.dered unconscionable.

However, in 1974 the

national prime rate climbed to the level of 12-12. 25 percent.

This,

of course, is the rate to the most credit worthy borrower, and most
firms cannot borrow at that rate.

A rate of 3. 0 percent or more over

the prime rate is not at all uncommon in banking for the less credit
worthy business borrower.

What this means is that market rates in

1974 were beginning to climb above Florida's corporate usury ceili ngs
for a portion of Florida business borrowers.

It's not possible to quantify

the impact this had on .the allocation of Florida corporate cred it during
the period except to note that lenders and borrowers assert that the Florida
corporate usury ceiling was beginning to restrict credit to certain corporate borrowers.

Had market rates climbed much higher, or if in the

future they should climb higher, Florida's corporate usury ceiling of 15
percent would act to disrupt corporate money markets as occurred in the
few states with lower corporate usury ceilings than Florida.
T he case of the noncorporate business borrower in Florida during
the tight money period of 1974-75 is exactly what would be expected. Banks
were paying 14 percent for Federal Funds and around 12 percent for cer
tificates of deposit.

The re was no way that they could take these funds and

relend them at 10 percent.

Thus. the individual and small Florida non

corporate business borrower were largely cut off from normal legitimate
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credit sources.

Florida 1 s usury ceiling is, therefore, particularly

disruptive to small business during periods of tight credit.
Despite the fact that there is general recognition that consumer
loans require higher rates to cover the greater degree of risk and ad
ministrative expense small loan ceilings have caused credit allocation
problems in this market as well.

There are many small loan statutes

in Florida that set different maximum rates depending on the amount
borrowed and the purpose of the· loan.

To take a typical example of a

new car loan in Florida the maximum rate is 14. 5 percent.13

Given

the high administrative costs of such lending along with the higher loan
losses normally associated with such loans lenders found this market
unprofitable when the costs of funds climbed to the record levels of
197 4-7 5.

Discussions with Florida bankers indicated that they con

tinued to make installment loans during this period because of the fact
that they did not wish to disrupt their dealer and installment customer
base.

That is, they were prepared to operate at a loss for a time in

order to insure their installment base over the. longer run when,
fully, the cost of money would be less.

hope

The bankers indicated, however,

that if the tight money conditions had continued they would have had to
curtail lending in this market.

The lesson is clear, funds are very

13
Florida Statute 520. 08(2) 1973.
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m obile and can be easily shifted to areas that produce higher returns.
Maximum usury ceilings cannot long remain below market rates before
the flow of funds will be cut off.
The brief summary of various usury studies presented above
provide the reader with the general flavor of this analysis.

There 1s

complete unanimity across these studies that usury statutes result 1n
the collapse of normal credit flows when market interest rates climb
above the usury ceiling.

In case after case it was found that the money

the protected borrower couldn't get didn't do him any good.

The det-

rirnental aspects of artificially low usury ceilings on efficient credit
allocations and on healthy economic growth are not open to question.
At the momenf market interest rates are once again generally
below Florida's usury ceilings.

It is, however, important to realize

that every swing in interest rates that has occurred in the last decade
has ended at a slightly higher level than the previous cycle.

Interest

rates are expected to climb again later this year and we have to recognize that they wouldn't have to climb very much before they would
once again be bumping Florida's usury ceiling in certain markets.
By definition, a usury statute is supposed to be designed to protect
the naive borrower from the unscrupulous lender and, therefore, a
usurious interest rate is one that is unconscionably high.

Given this

concept of usury there is something fundamentally wrong with a state
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statute that defines usury at or below existing market levels.

Obviously,

a change in Florida's usury statutes is in order.

C.

Recommendations
When considering a change in Florida I s usury statutes three

alternatives come to mind.

The alternatives are:

(1)

Raise the interest

ceiling to some level higher than the present 10 percent to individuals and
15 percent to corporations, (2)

peg the ceiling to some floating indicator

which would reflect movements in general market rates and (3)

remove

general usury ceiling entirely.
Raising the ceiling has to be viewed as a temporary solution since
as we have seen, if the ceiling is effective it operates to stop the flow of
investment rather than improving the terms of investment. If the usury
ceiling d iscriminates against borrowers at 10 percent,
at 15 or 20 percent if market rates go that high.

In

it will do so again

the interim it will have

no effect on the flow of funds since yield spreads will be determined by
market forces.
The basic idea of a floating definition of usurious interest rates
tied in some way to financial market conditions has a great deal of intellectual appeal.

Unfortunately, when one tries to implement the concept

one Lnds such a range of loan risks, loan sizes, loan costs, and loan
maturities that it is impossible to come up with an acceptable index that
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would not at the same time be an administrative nightmare.

Basically,

the concept could only be made to work if the definition of usury were
set sufficiently high above the index market rate, e.g., U.S. Treasury
Bill rate, or money center prime rate, etc. so that most loan situations
could be covered.

But this would be equivalent to no usury ceiling at all

and administratively more complex.

This Committee joins all of the

other usury study groups in not recommending a floating usury concept.
The most desirable choice from the viewpoint of public benefit
would be the complete removal of the usury ceiling.

All markets would

then be able to compete freely for credit and the rationing of credit would
be solely on the basis of price.

Money would be available as long as the

borrower were willing to pay the price.
Your Committee agrees with the above argument and, therefore,
recommends the following:
1.

Section 687. 02, Florida Statutes, and all sections relating
to such statutes be repealed allowing Section 687. 01 to
remain as the law regarding interest rates.

This section

presently reads: "687. 01. Rate of Interest - In all cases
where interest shall accrue without a special contract
for the rate thereof, the rate shall be 6. 0 percent per
annum, but parties may contract for a lesser or greater
rate by contract in writing.

11

Stated briefly, interest rate
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ceilings would be eliminated for written contracts.
This recommendation should not be viewed as daring
or novel.

As can be seen in Table 1 many states have

exempted all or most of their credit markets from usury
ceilings.

Loan sharks have not moved to these states.

Actual interest rates have ended up no higher or lower
than in states that have maintained usury ceilings.
There is, therefore, complete proof that market com
petition can efficiently regulate interest rates without
the risk of artificial limits.
Your Committee, however, recognized that usury is an emotional
issue and that there might be some who would be prepared to liberalize
Florida's usury statute but would like to provide some protection for the
naive borrower.

As an acceptable but somewhat less desirable alternative

your Committee suggests the following:
2.

Section 687. 02 be repealed and Section 687. 01 be amended
to read:

"Section 687. 01. Rate of Interest - In all cases

where interest shall accrue without a special contract for
the rate thereof, the rate shall be 6. 0 percent per annum,
but as to all loans in excess of $15,000 the parties may
contract for a lesser or greater rate by contract in writing."
Stated briefly, interest rate ceilings on all loans above
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$15,000 would be set by the small luan statutes of the
state and hopefully reviewed periodically to as sure that
the maximum rate was high enough not to interfere with
the allocation of market credit.
Any liberalization of Florida I s usury statute would be a step in
the right direction and would serve to protect the state 1 s economy in the
event that tight money conditions once again occur red.

The liberalization

could, of course, take an almost infinite number of forn1s.

Your Commit-

tee strongly suggests, however, that small halfway n,easures be rejected
when considering a change in the state 1 s usury law.

A small adjustment

to the present law would be at best a temporary solution and would risk
damage to the economy if market rates were to cli mb above the usury
There must always be ample elbow room between a state's defi

ceiling.

nition of usury and market interest rates or credit flows will be distorted.
For most of the p ost World War II period the usury ceiling in Florida ranged
from two to three times the prevailing market rate.
In summary, your Committee recommends in order of preference
either (l) the complete elimination of usury ceilings or (2) the t'liminalion
of usury ceilings on all loans over $15,000.

Your Committee, however,

is well aware that other options exist and the Committee stands ready to
share its background research with any group assigned to develop such
options.
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D.

Reasons for the Recommendations
l.

The Existing Law is Allocative Rather than Protective
The purpose of the state I s original usury law was
presumably to protect the people of Florida from paying
exorbitant rates of interest for the use of money.

When

the definition of usury rate is close to or below the existing
market rate it can no longer be said to serve that purpose.
The current effect of the law is not :s.o much to protect
citizens of Florida from borrowing money at rates above
10 percent (15 percent if a corporation) as to keep them
from borrowing money at all when market rates climb
above the usury limits.

The effect of the law has become

one of allocating available funds to those borrowers in
whose favor the law discriminates and away from those
against whom the law discriminates.

The evidence to

support this is overwhelming.

2.

Statutory Rates and Market Rates
The fear most commonly expressed 1s that interest
rates in the market will rise if the usury limit is raised,
There is no evidence to support such a claim but instead
all evidence indicates that such a fear is unfounded. For
example, most loan rates in Florida are currently well
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below the usury maximum and if the maximum were raised
it would have no effect whatever on the market rate.
3.

Precedent
The Legislature of Florida has already established a
precedent for exempting specific kinds of loans and borrowers
from the statutory usury rate and has done so on many occasions.
Other states have done the same.

The Commission is merely

suggesting that all lenders and borrowers be treated with
greater uniformity.

Is there any logical or legitimate reason

that the State of Florida would wish to allocate available credit
to corporate borrowers and away from noncorporate borrowers
during periods of tight money?
4.

Florida in Relation to the Nation
The economic growth of the State of Florida and the ilow
of funds into and out of the state are dependent on Florida's
relative attractiveness to individuals and industry when compared
with other states.

Florida is not a self-contained economy.

During every period of tight money the outside flow of funds
into Florida is drastically cut back because the existing law.
limits profitability and the lender finds he can go elsewhere
to obtain a higher return.
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Who is being protected?

Are the people of Florida

not willing to pay the going rate for money?

The people

are willing but an archaic law keeps them from the right
to freely compete for funds.

The law is out of step with

the reality of the market.

5.

The Home Building Industry
The home building industry in Florida 1s always parti
cularly hard hit by tight money conditions since it is one of
the few markets not subject to some kind of exemption from
the state's basic usury rate.

In a rapidly growing state

like Florida the construct ion industry is a far larger part
of the total economy than it is in slower growing regions.
A sick construction industry in Florida means a more slug

gish state economy than is true in most other states.
During the last period of tight money the housing in
dustry had problems in attracting funds nationwide.

A

change in the state's usury law would not have completely
solved this problem.

It would, however, have helped to

prevent the Florida housing industry from being as hard
hit as it was.
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6.

But What A bout Unscrupulous Lenders?
One cannot discuss the pros and cans of usury statutes in any depth without coming to grips with the fact that
loan sharking does exist in the United States and in Florida.
This kind of lending at rates up to ZO percent per week is
in fact highly profitable and it's estimated that it nets the
unscrupulous lenders close to $1 billion per year. 14
Of critical importance, however, is to recognize that
usury laws have not successfully stopped this practice.
Indeed, it has been argued that the higher risk borrowers
who are refused credit by legitimate lenders because of
usury laws are forced to seek funds from loan sharks who
ignore the legislated ceilings.

In short, we have at the

present time the worst of all possible situations.

We have

usury laws that are difficult and costly to administer, usury
ceilings that can and do interfere with the efficient allocation
of credit, and at the same time usury laws that do not prevent
the kinds of usurious lending practices for which they were
intended.
An inescapable conclusion is that the traditional usury laws foster

14

Jarret C. Oeltjen, "Usury: Utilitarian or Useless ? " Florida State
University Law Reveiw, Vol. 3, Spring 1975, p. 219.
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rather than prevent loan sharking.

This practice cannot be stopped by

usury laws and, therefore, such laws should be scrapped.

Second, if

society wishes to curtail the harmful effects of loan sharking, it must
challenge the economic base on which loan sharking rests, by providing
legitimate competition for the loan shark.

TABLE 1
STATE USURY LAWS1
State

Basic Rate

Alabama

8%

Alaska

1 2%

Some Major Exceptions
For individuals, firms, partnerships, associa
tions, and non-profit organizations the rate is
8% on loans to $100,000 and 15% on loans above
that. These same groups may agree to pay
more than 15% on loans greater than $100,000.
For corporations the maximum rate is 8% on
loans to $10,000, 15% on loans between $10, 000
to $100,000 and no ceiling on loans above
$100,000.
Twelve-and-one-half percent 1s the rate on
real estate contracts.
Eighteen percent is the ceiling for loans over
$5000 to corporations.

Arizona
Arkansas

10%

California

10%

Savings and loan associations, industrial loan
companies, banks, credit unions, and agri
culture associations are exempt from the
usury law.

Colorado

1 2%

The maximum charge on non-supe rvised con
sumer loans is 12%. On supervised loans,
except for revolving loans, the maxinrnm rate
is the greater of 18% on all unpaid balances;
or a total of 36% on unpaid balances of $300
or less; 21% on unpaid balances over $300
and not over $1000; and 15% on unpaid balances
over $1000. The maximum rate on consumer
related loans is 18%, on revolving loans 12%,
and all other loans 45%

Connecticut

12%

The ceiling rate on loans to corporations in
excess of $10,000 is 18%. The 12% ceiling
does not apply to any loan made by a
national or state bank or savings & loan, to
any mortgage on real property in excess of
$5,000, or made pursuant to a revolving
loan agreement on which the total principal
amount owing is more than $10,000.

STATE USURY LAWS (Cont.)
State

Basic Rate

Delaware

9%

There is no limit on collateral loans larger
than $5000. Also the ceiling rate may be
exceeded on loans secured by real estate
only through written agreement.

District of Columbia

8%

Loans guaranteed under the National Housing
Act or by the VA are exempt.

:'3ome Major Exceptions

Florida

1 0%

The ceiling is 15% for corporate loans and
all other loans above $500,000.

Georgia

8%

No ceiling applies on loans above $2500 to
corporations and on loans above $100,000
to individuals. Loans secured by realty
may carry a rate of up to 9%.

Hawaii

1 2%

Idaho

Illinois

The maximum rate on non-supervised con
sumer loans is 18% and on revolving loans
15%. Supervised loans carry a maximum
rate of 18% on all unpaid balances, or a
total of 36% on unpaid balances of $390
or less, 21% on unpaid balances between
$39 and $1300, and 15% on unpaid balances
over $1300. A ceiling of 12% applies to
loans of over $10,000 to corporations. Firms
engaged in agriculture may be required to
pay a maximum of only 10% on loans.
8%

All corporate loans and business loans to
non-profit organizations; as well as mort
gage loans insured by the FHA or guaranteed
by the VA may be contracted for at any rate.
Also secured loans greater than $5000 may
be at any rate. Effective July 12, 1974 the
maximum interest rate that may be charged
on loans secured by residential real estate
and entered into before July 1, 197 5 was
raised to 9½%,

STATE USURY LAWS (Cont.)
State
Indiana

Iowa
Kansas

Basic Rate
1 8%

A maximum rate of 18% applies lo non
supervised consumer loans, consumer
related loans and revolving loans. Super
vised loans carry a maximum rate of the
greater of 18% on all unpaid balances, or
a total of 36% on unpaid balances of $300 or
less, 21% on unpaid balances over $300 but
under $1000, and 15% on unpaid balances
over $1000. There is no maxinrnm charge
on other loans.

9%

There is no ceiling rate on either corporate
loans or real estai:e investment lrusls.

10%

Maine

Maryland

Massachusetts

Consumer loans other than supervised loans
cary a maximum rate of 12%. The maximum
charge on supervised loans is 18% on the
fir st $1000 and 14. 45% on any additional.
There is no ceiling on any other type of
loan.
There 1s no ceiling on loans over $25,000
which are not on a single unit family resi
dence. No special rate applies on loans
to corporations.

Kentucky

Louisiana

Some Major Exceptions

8%

Loans secured by real estate carry a max
imum rate of 10%. However, loans guar anteed by Federal agencies are exempt from
the usury laws. Corporate loans may be
any rate.

16%

No maximum rate applies if the loan is for
non-personal or business purposes and the
contract is in writing and involves more than
$2000.

8%

No ceiling applies to business loans in excess
of $5000. Residential mortgage loans may
be at 10%.

None

STATE USURY LAWS (Cont.)
State

Basic Rate

Some Major Exceptions

Michigan

7%

No ceiling rate applies to corporate loans,
realty secured loans, or federally or state
approved loans.

Minnesota

8%

No ceiling rate is applied to loans in excess
of $100,000.

Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska

10 %

8%

Corporate loans may be at any rate,

10 %
9%

Nevada

12%

New Hampshire

None

New Jersey

8%

New Mexico

10 %

New York
North Carolina

Corporations organized for profit may pay
to 15% on loans in excess of $2500.

Corporate loans may be at any rate. The
maximum rate is waived on certain loans
by building and loan associations, instal
lment loans, industrial loans, and personal
loans by bank and trust companies or credit
unions.

The basic rate applies to loans under $50,000.
Loans secured by realty carry a maximum
of 9½%. The rates are not applicable to
loan contracts made by savings and loan
companies, banks, or z..ny department of
Housing and Urban Affairs or FHA approved
loans purchased by Federal gave rnment.
A 12% ceiling applies to unsecured loans.
Demand notes of $5000 or over with collateral
security may carry a rate of up to 25%.

8%

Ceiling rates on loans are graduated according
to the size and purpose of the loans reaching
12% on loans of $100,000 and unlimited on loans
of $300,000 and larger. First mortgages on
single family dwellings may be contracted for
in writing at any rate agreed upon by the parties.
Corporations may pay any rate,

STATE USURY LAWS (Cont.)
State
Ohio

Basic Rate
8%

Some Major Exceptions
Loans 1n excess of $100,000 may be at any
rate. Loans to corporations exempt.

Oklahoma

10%

Oklahoma's Uniform Consumer Credit Code
allows 18% to supervised lenders and 10% to
others lending to consumers. There 1s no
ceiling rate on other types of loans.

Oregon

10%

Loans in excess of $50,000 may be made at
any rate. The maximum rate on loans smaller
than $50,000 is 12% for corporations and 10%
for individuals and non-profit organizations.

Pennsylvania

6%

Rhode Island

21o/o

South Carolina

8%

The maximum rate does not apply to loans of
more than $ 50, 000; loans of $50, 000 or less
secured by a lien upon real property; loans to
business corporations; unsecured, non
collateralized loans in excess of $35,000; and
business loans in excess of $10,000. The
interest rate on residential mortgages of an
original principal of $ 50,000 or less is a
fluctuating administered rate. For July 1974
this rate was set at 9. 5%

The maximum rate on loans of from $50,000 to
$100,000 is 10% and on loans between $100,000
and $500,000, 12%. Loans larger than $500,000
may be at any rate. First mortgage real estate
loans made by savings and loan companies, the
Department of Housing & Urban Affairs or
FHA approved mortgages are exempt.

South Dakota

10%

Corporate loans may carry any rate. However,
the maximum rate on all loans on real estate
regardless of borrower is 10%,

Tennessee

10%

The contract rate does not apply to loans extendec
under the Industrial Loan and Thrift Company Act
or to installment loans of banks and trust com
panies and building and loan associations on whid
interest is deducted in advance and added to the
principal.

STATE USURY LAWS (Cont.)
State

Ba sic Rate

Some Major Exceptions

Texas

10%

Corporate loans above $5000 have an 18% ceiling.

Utah

18%

Revolving loans and non-supervised consumer
loans carry a maximum rate of 18%. Supervised
loans carry a maximum rate of 18% on all unpaid
balances, or a total of 36% on unpaid balances
of $390 or less; 21% on unpaid balances over
$1300. All other loans may be made at any
rate.

Vermont

Virginia
Washington
We st Virginia

No ceiling rate applies to loans for income pro
ducing business or activity. Loans to finance
real estate which is to be used as a primary
residence or for agriculture is subject to the
contract rate. However, loans to finance real
estate improvements or a second residence
may be at any rate.
8%

Any rate may apply to non-agricultural loans
secured by a first mortgage or realty.

12%
8%

Wisconsin

12%

Corp orate loans may be at any rate.

Wyoming

10%

Revolving loans and consumer loans other than
supervised loans may carry a maximum rate of
10%. Supervised loans may be at a rate of the
greater of 18% on all unpaid balances of $300
or less, 21% on unpaid balances over $300 and not
over $1000, and 15% on unpaid balances over
$1000. All other loans may be at any rate.

1The initial table was compiled by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis in August
1974 and updated by the Committee during fall of 1976.

Exhibit 1
USURY COMMITTEE

Broward County:
Kenneth Jenne, II, Attorney
2421 North 40th Avenue
Hollywood, Florida 33021

Joe D'Apice
Condominium Owners Association
16604 N. E. Fourth Avenue
North Miami Beach, Florida 33162

Dade County:

Simeon Spear, CPA
5 700 N. E. Fourth Court
Miami, Florida 33132

Lon Worth Crow, Jr. - Chairman
Southeast Mortgage Company
1390 Brickell Avenue
Miami, Florida 33131
Walter S. Falk
Metropolitan Mortgage Company
2244 Biscayne Boulevard
Miami, Florida 33137
Max Friedson
Congress of Senior Citizens
1111 N. E. Second Avenue
Miami, Florida 33132
Amos Jenkins - Assistant Chief
Dade County Aviation, Security
& Safety
776 N. W. 52nd Street
Miami, Florida 33127
Molly Brilliant
Democratic Women's Club
5835 S. W. 50th Terrace
Miami, Florida 33155

Helen Pryima, Chairman
Zoning & Planning Board, Hialeah
155 East 11th Street
Hialeah, Florida 33010
Richard B. Wolf
2800 Toledo Avenue
Coral Gables, Florida

33134

Palm Beach County:
Alice C. Skaggs
Director of Consumer Department
P.O. Box 1989
Palm Beach, · Florida 33401
Leon County:
Robert Fokes, Esq.
2 50 Barnett Building
Tallahassee, Florida

32804
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A bill to be entitled

An Act relating to usury; amending s. 687.03(2)(a),
Florida Statutes, to clarify language relating to
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providing an effective date.
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Paragraph (a) of subsection (2) of section

131687.03, Florida Statutes, is amended to read:
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(2)(a)

"Unlawful rates of interest" defined; proviso.-

The provisions of this section and of s. 687.02
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Wyatt Martin, Esq.
Committee on Commerce
Florida House of Representatives
310 House Office Building
Tallahassee, Florida 32304
Dear Wyatt,
I have reviewed PCB #37 and find it satisfactory,
with one exception: commitments are now issued in
bulk by some government agencies, individually by
other agencies. To cover both contingencies, I have
revised the proposed language slightly, and enclose
a copy of the revision with the changes made by me
being underlined.
Your consideration of this modification will be
appreciated.
--�,

You';s} truly,
/ •.•.. I

_;

/

/

),

Barrett Sanders
Associate Counsel
BS:eg
Encl.

1390 Brickell Avenue Miami, Florida 33131

(305) 577-3900

PCB #37

Section 1,
3.

(2)

(a) subparagraph 3:

A commitment to purchase such loans either

individually or in bulk issued by the Federal National
Mortgage Association; Government National Mortgage
Association; Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation; any
department, agency or instrumentality of the Federal
Government; or any successor of any of them, pursuant
to any provisions of the acts of Congress or federal
regulations; provided such loans are delivered to and
acquired by such purchaser under the provisions of the
commitment to purchase.

FLORIDA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
DONALD L. TUCKER, Speaker/JOHN L. RYALS, Speaker Pro Tern pore

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE

John R. Forbes
Chairman

March 30, 1978

John W. Lewis
Vice Chairman

ADDENDUM TO STAFF REPORT
PCB #37 -- usury
The subcommittee amendment removes the requirement of
subsection (2) (a) 3. that a loan made pursuant to a commitment
to purchase issued by any of the federal instrumentalities
be delivered to and acquired by them.
The adoption of this
amendment has the effect of changing existing law; therefore,
the statement in the original staff report is incorrect to
the extent that it states that existing law is not being
changed. This bill is no longer merely clarifying existing
law.
The bill as amended would allow any loan made pursuant
to a commitment to purchase issued by any of the mentioned
federal instrumentalities to be exempt from the general
usury law whether or not the loan was delivered to or
acquired by the federal agency. The lender could retain
the loan in his own portfolio or sell the loan to some other
entity without losing the exemption.
WTM/jc

Jack Herzog, Staff Director
310 House Office Building, Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (004) 488-2123

